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Abstract
We deﬁne a hypergraph by a set of associations which consist of nonexclusive two or
more players. It is a generalization of a graph (or a network) in the sense that an association,
the counterpart of a link in a hypergraph, connects any number of nodes, not simply a pair of
nodes. We characterize the eﬃcient hypergraphs and stable hypergraphs for the linear variable
cost of associations. The eﬃcient hypergraph is either the empty hypergraph or the grand
hypergraph consisting of a single grand association. The stable hypergraph can be a grand
hypergraph, a star hypergraph or a line hypergraph. If a star hypergraph is stable, it must have
a singleton center. Generally, a hypergraph can be underconnected, but cannot be over-
connected.
JEL Classiﬁcation Code: C72
Key Words: Association, Eﬃciency, Hypergraph, Network, Stability
I. Introduction
Economic agents often share information only with some group of people by forming an
informal or formal organization (or association) such as academic associations, social clubs,
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 50 (2009), pp.107-122. Ⓒ Hitotsubashi University
＊ This project was begun when the second author was visiting University of Catholica at Milan in summer of 2005.
We are grateful to the audience of the annual conference of the Korean Econometric Society held at Seoul National
University in February of 2007 and the seminar participants at Hitotsubashi University, especially Taiji Furusawa, for
helpful comments.
＊＊ Corresponding author.research joint ventures etc. Various kinds of associations engage in many other activities in
addition to sharing information all of which could be understood as beneﬁting the members
through their collaborations.
Such associations are, however, neither exclusive nor comprehensive. Some agents may
join in several associations, while others may join in no association. Many associations have
overlapping members. The members overlapped in more than one association may play the role
of mediating information between associations. Thus, through the mediator, an agent can get
indirect beneﬁts from the association to which he does not belong. Joining in an association
does not only yield (direct and indirect) beneﬁts but also incurs some costs. For example, a
member should pay the membership fee and perform some duty to sustain his association.
We will call a set of associations a hypergraph. It is a generalization of a graph (or a
network) in graph theory. While a link in a network directly connects only a pair of nodes, an
association in a hypergraph connects any number of nodes. While a link in a network can be
formed by the joint decision of two players, an association in a hypergraph can be formed by
the joint decision of any number of players more than one.
In a hypergraph, a player can share the value of people who join in the same association,
thereby getting direct beneﬁts from joining in an association. In addition, he enjoys indirect
beneﬁts from members in diﬀerent associations who are indirectly connected through the
member of his association. Indeed, the value from indirect connection is discounted. On the
other hand, the cost of maintaining an association consists of the ﬁxed cost and the variable
cost proportional to its size. The total maintaining cost of an association is shared equally by its
members.
In this paper, we will deﬁne the eﬃciency and the stability of a hypergraph by extending
t h ec o n c e p to fe ﬃciency and stability of a network by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The
eﬃcient hypergraph is deﬁned by the one that maximizes the sum of the net beneﬁt of all the
players. A hypergraph is deﬁn e dt ob es t a b l ei fn op l a y e rh a sa ni n c e n t i v et oe x i tunilaterally
from any of his associations, and no coalition of players has joint incentives to form a new
association.
We deﬁne a hierarchical hypergraph by the hypergraph that contains an association with
its subassociation. Then, we can show that a hierarchical hypergraph can be neither eﬃcient nor
stable. Intuitively, this is because any player in a subassociation can be made better oﬀ by
exiting from the subassociation without aﬀecting the payoﬀ of players outside the subassocia-
tion. Then, we mainly characterize the eﬃcient hypergraphs and stable hypergraphs for the
linear variable cost of associations. The eﬃcient hypergraph is either the empty hypergraph or
the grand hypergraph consisting of a single grand association. The stable hypergraph can be a
grand hypergraph, a star hypergraph or a line hypergraph. A circle hypergraph cannot be stable
if the number of players is more than three. We also show that a stable star hypergraph must
have a singleton center. The intuitive reason is that the loss of a center from exiting from one
of his association is small as far as he maintains indirect connections with the association
members via diﬀerent associations. Since a playerʼs gain from joining in the grand association
is larger than his loss from exiting out of his association, there is no cost structure preventing
both incentives to form a grand association and to exit from an association. The tension
between eﬃciency and stability that is identiﬁed by Jackson and Wolinsky still exists in
hypergraph formation, but only in one direction. In other words, we show that a stable
hypergraph can be underconnected but not overconnected, which is contrasted with Jackson and
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coordination problem which is the main source of the overconnected network. Then, we
consider a stronger concept of stability referred to as strong stability following the spirit of
Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) and Jackson and Nouweland (2005). A restrictive feature of the
stability is that it allows only a deviation to exit by a single player and a deviation to form a
new association with maintaining current associations. Strong stability allows more deviations.
Roughly speaking, it allows any kind of deviation by any coalition. We then demonstrate that
the eﬃcient hypergraph coincides with the strongly stable hypergraph.
There are closely related papers. Myerson (1980) was the ﬁrst to introduce the concept of
hypergraph into economics. However, he did not consider the problem of forming a
hypergraph. Moreover, he interpreted a conference (or association) in a hypergraph as a group
of people who can collaborate with one another only if all of them are present. Aumann and
Drèze (1974), and Hart and Kurz (1983) studied a game with coalitional structures. An
association in a hypergraph is similar to a coalition in a coalition structure in the sense that its
members can communicate with one another as if it were exactly a complete network, but the
one diﬀers from the other because associations can overlap with each other unlike coalitions in
a coalition structure. Slikker et al. (2000) also consider the problem of hypergraph formation.
However, they do not take the cost into account, just as Aumann and Myerson, and adopt
Myersonʼs interpretation of hypergraphs as a group of players who can communicate only when
all of them are present, which leads to the diﬀerent architecture of a hypergraph.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce some deﬁnitions in graph
theory. In Section III, we set up the model. In Section IV, we deﬁne the eﬃciency and the
stability of a hypergraph and characterize eﬃcient hypergraphs and stable hypergraphs in the
case that the variable cost of forming an association is linear in its size. In Section V, we
introduce a more reﬁned stability concept, strong stability. In Section VI, we examine how our
results can be aﬀected in the case of the convex variable cost. Concluding remarks follow in
Section VII.
II. Deﬁnitions
Let N be a set of players with | N |/n?*. A set of nodes S( N) is called a coalition of
N. A hypergraph H is deﬁned by a family of coalitions (subsets) of N,{ A}, with | A |B2.
1 We
will denote the set of all possible hypergraphs on N by Η.A ne l e m e n tA of a hypergraph is
called an association.
2 The size of an association A is deﬁn e db y| A |. All members in an
association can communicate with one another without friction. Associations are not mutually
exclusive, so that a player can participate in more than one association. If A B for some A,
B H, we call A a subassociation of B. A hypergraph H is called hierarchical if some
association A H has a subassociation.
Many concepts for graphs can be extended to hypergraphs. We can deﬁne a path in H
between players i and j by a sequence (i,i1,i2,…,ik, j) such that i,i1 A0, i1,i2 A1,…,ik, j Ak
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1 A hypergraph is a generalized concept of a graph (or a network) because it includes A with | A |/2.
2 Note that an association is deﬁn e di nam a n n e rs p e c i ﬁc to a given hypergraph, whereas a coalition is deﬁned
independently of a hypergraph.for some A0,…, Ak H, and say that the path has the length of k. If there is a path between i
and j, we say that i and j are connected. In particular, if i, j A for some A H so that the path
between i and j has the length of 0, we say that they are directly connected. The distance
between two players i and j is deﬁned by the length of the shortest path between them and
denoted by t (i, j). If i and j are directly connected, t (i, j)/0. We deﬁne t (i, j)/* if i and j
are not connected.
We deﬁne the degree of player i by the number of players to whom player i is directly
connected, and denote it by d (i). We will call a hypergraph complete if d (i)/n,1 for all
i N. Note that the complete hypergraph is not unique. We will call a hypergraph H/{N}t h e
grand hypergraph and denote it by H
n.
3 A hypergraph H is called connected if there is a path
for any distinct players i, j N. If a hypergraph is not connected, the set N is partitioned into
several disjoint connected components.
4 We will call a component consisting of a single player
a trivial component. If all components in a hypergraph are trivial, it is called the empty
hypergraph and denoted by H
0.
We can deﬁne a star, a line and a circle as follows. Let H/{Ak |1CkCm(B2)}. We will
call a hypergraph H a star and denote it by H* if there exists a nonempty subset R N such
that Ai Aj/R and R Ak for all i, j, k. The set R will be called centers of H
* and the set H
*
'R called peripheries. We will call a hypergraph H a line and denote it by H
l if Ak Ak+1/Lk
4 , Lk Ak, Ak+1,a n dAk Aj/  for j4k,1, k+1 and for 1CkCm,1. Finally, a circle
will be deﬁned by H
c≡H
l∪Am+1 where Aj Am+14  for j/1,m and Aj Am+1/  for
j41,m. Note that hierarchical hypergraphs are excluded from stars, lines and circles by the
conditions that R Ak and Lk Ak, Ak+1.
We will denote by H+A the hypergraph obtained by adding a coalition A to H as a new
association and by H,A the hypergraph obtained by eliminating an association A from H.
Also, if there is no chance of confusion, we will use the notation of H,i(A)t om e a nt h e
hypergraph obtained by player iʼs exit from the association A. In other words, H,i(A)a n dH,
(A,A'{i}) are equivalent.
III. Model
We consider the connections model developed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) with a
modiﬁcation of replacing links by associations.
Each player has a value normalized to one. Players can share their values by organizing an
association. Players can also get indirect beneﬁt from indirectly connected players.
Let Ai be an association to which player i belongs and Ai be the set of such associations,





where d (0,1) is the discount factor.
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3 In fact, it is the minimal complete hypergraph in the sense that it contains the minimum number of elements among
all complete hypergraphs.
4 A component C can be deﬁned by a set of players in N such that i, j C if and only if i and j are connected.On the other hand, it is costly to form an association. We assume that the cost of
organizing an association A, which is denoted by C(A), is increasing in the size of A,|A |. We
also assume that this cost is shared equally by the members of A. The cost of player i from the




| Ai | .
Thus, the payoﬀ (net beneﬁt) of player i is pi (H)/Bi (H),Ci (H). We can also deﬁne the
value from hypergraph H by V(H)/6i N pi (H).
This model is general in the sense that it includes a variety of network formation models
as special cases. Note that the model corresponds to the connections model by Jackson and
Wolinsky in the case that C(A)/2c if | A |/2, and C(A)/* if | A |B3 where c (0,*)i st h e
connection cost incurred by a linking party.
In this paper, we will focus our attention to the case of the linear variable cost, C(A)/c0
+c| A |, where c0, c>0.
5 We can think of c0 the cost of installing the hub (dummy player,
coordinator, secretary etc.) of the association, and c as the cost that the coordinator
disseminates information to each member. This simple linear cost structure will help us to
obtain clear analytic results.
IV. Eﬃciency and Stability
We can generalize two central concepts, eﬃciency and stability, by Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) to the formation of hypergraphs.
The hypergraph H is eﬃcient if it maximizes the sum of net beneﬁts, i.e., V(H)BV(H')
for all H'4H. On the other hand, the hypergraph H is stable if (I) for any A H and for any
i A, pi (H)Bpi (H,i (A)), and (II) for any S H such that | S |B2 and for any i S, pi
(H+S) > pi (H) implies pj (H+S) ?pj (H) for some j S. In words, the stability of a
hypergraph requires that no player has an incentive to exit from an association unilaterally,a n d
that no coalition of more than one player has the incentive to form a new association
collectively.
1. Eﬃcient Hypergraph
A series of lemmas are in order.
Lemma 1 A hierarchical hypergraph cannot be eﬃcient for any C(A) and d.
Proof. See the appendix.
Lemma 1 can be strengthened by the following lemma.
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5 If c0/0, much of the analysis is made trivial, while the results themselves remains unaﬀected. Moreover, the case
that c0/0 is somewhat unrealistic. An association could be interpreted as an alternative to a (complete) subnetwork
among a group of players which works in the way that it reduces the per capita cost of communication by incurring
some extra ﬁxed cost.Lemma 2 If S(4 ) N is contained in more than one association in H, H cannot be eﬃcient
for any C(A) and d.
Proof. See the appendix.
This lemma implies that the eﬃcient hypergraph must have k(B1) disjoint subsets and
each of the associations constitutes a component. Thus, the only possible eﬃcient hypergraph
among complete hypergraphs is the grand hypergraph, and the eﬃcient hypergraph other than
the grand hypergraph must be disconnected.
Lemma 3 The eﬃcient hypergraph cannot contain more than one nontrivial component for any
C(A) and d.
Proof. See the appendix.
This lemma characterizes eﬃcient hypergraphs.
Proposition 1 The unique eﬃcient hypergraph is H
n if c ~(n)6c+
c0
n ?n,1 and is H
0 if c ~(n)
>n,1.
Proof. See the appendix.
We can interpret c ~(n)a n dn,1 as an increase in per player cost and beneﬁt respectively
when the hypergraph is changed from H
0 to H
* . Proposition 1 says that the eﬃcient
hypergraph must be either the empty hypergraph if the increase in the cost exceeds the increase
in the beneﬁt, or the grand hypergraph otherwise.
It deserves comparing this proposition with the result of Jackson and Wolinsky. Two
striking diﬀerences are in order. First, the star structure cannot be an eﬃcient hypergraph, while
it can be an eﬃcient network in the model of Jackson and Wolinsky. This contrasted feature is
the direct consequence of Lemma 2 which has the implication that an indirect connection can
never be eﬃcient in hypergraph formation. This result comes mainly from the assumption of
cost structures. The crucial intuition for the eﬃcient star in network formation is that an
indirect link between a pair of agents can be more eﬃcient than a direct link between them,
i.e., 1,c>d where c is the cost of forming a direct link.
6 In our model, it is not possible, that
is, an indirect connection is always less eﬃcient than a direct connection made by forming one
large association encompassing all the agents involved in the connection structure. For example,
a structure with two links between player 1 and 2 and between player 2 and 3 is inferior to one
with the association {1,2,3}. By including all the involved players into one association, one
could save the ﬁxed cost and reduce the variable cost as well. Note that the variable connection
cost increases with the size of an association, while the connection cost of a complete network
increases geometrically with the size of the network. Second, the eﬃcient hypergraph does not
depend on d, unlike the eﬃcient network identiﬁed by Jackson and Wolinsky. This observation
is a direct corollary of the ﬁrst observation. Since Lemma 2 holds regardless of the size of d,
overlapping associations implying indirect connections cannot be constituent of the eﬃcient
hypergraph; hence, no indirect beneﬁt in the eﬃcient hypergraph.
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6 Here, we are abusing notation c.2. Stable Hypergraph
While the eﬃcient hypergraph is expected to emerge in a centralized environment, a stable
hypergraph can be formed in a decentralized environment as a consequence of the decision of
each player maximizing his own payoﬀ. After characterizing stable hypergraphs, we will
compare them with the eﬃcient hypergraph.
Lemma 4 A hierarchical hypergraph cannot be stable for any C(A) and d.
Proof. See the appendix.
Due to Lemma 4, we can restrict our attention to non-hierarchical hypergraphs for
stability. Nonetheless, it is still burdensome to check whether a given hypergraph satisﬁes
condition (II) of stability, since the number of all possible hypergraphs, | H |/2
N where
N/2
| N |,| N |,1, is tremendously large. The following lemma provides a suﬃcient condition
for condition (II).
Lemma 5 Let i0 /arg mini N Bi (H) for a non-hierarchical hypergraph H4H
n . Then, H
satisﬁes condition (II) if pi0 (H)Bpi0 (H+N).
Proof. See the appendix.
Lemma 5 will turn out to be useful in characterizing stable hypergraphs. We have
Proposition 2 (i) The grand hypergraph is stable if and only if c ~(n)?n,1.
7 (ii) Any star
hypergraph with | R |/1 is stable if c ~ (2) ?1 and c ~ (n) > (1,d)( n,2) . (iii) Any line
hypergraph with | L1 |/| Lm |/1 is stable if c ~(2)?1 and c ~(n)>6
n-2
t=1(1,d
t). (iv) If nB4, a
circle hypergraph cannot be stable. A circle can be stable if n/3 and c ~(2)?1,d.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 2(i) says that the grand hypergraph is stable if and only if it is eﬃcient.
Proposition 2 (ii) and (iii) suggest that the hypergraph can be underconnected in the sense that
a star hypergraph or a line can be stable when c ~(n)?n,1, i.e., the grand hypergraph is the
unique eﬃcient hypergraph. The intuition for this is that although the grand hypergraph is
eﬃcient, players cannot break up the status quo associations and reorganize the grand
association. It is less beneﬁcial for players to organize the grand association with maintaining
their current associations than to move from the empty hypergraph to the grand hypergraph.
The intuitive reason for Proposition 2(iv) is that the cost high enough to discourage players
from organizing the grand association cannot prevent the incentive to exit from a small
association. Then, why can a line be stable although a circle cannot be? This is because it is
more tempting for an agent to exit in a circle than in a line. He loses the beneﬁtm u c hl e s si na
circle, as he still maintains an indirect connection with other agents even after he exits from
one association in a circle.
Proposition 2 (ii) only provides suﬃcient conditions for the stability of a star hypergraph,
but indeed a star hypergraph with | R |B2 cannot be stable.
Proposition 3 A star hypergraph with | R |B2 cannot be stable.
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7 We are assuming that a tie in payoﬀs is resolved in favor of deviation.Proof. See the appendix.
The main reason for this proposition is that the loss in beneﬁts occurring when an agent
exits from the center with | R |B2i sm u c hs m a l l e rt h a nw h e n|R |/1. Let us elaborate on the
intuition. For the grand association to be unproﬁtable, the per capita formation cost should be
high enough that c ~(n)>(1,d)(n,2). However, in that case, an agent in R with | R |B2 does
have an incentive to exit from one of his association, because c ~(m)>
c ~(n)
n,2 >1,d for any
mB3. If the center of a star is a singleton, however, it can be stable if discounting is large,
because the loss from the centerʼs exit out of an association which does not depend on the
discount factor can be larger than the gain from joining in the grand association which gets
smaller as discounting is larger.
Proposition 4 The stable hypergraph cannot be overconnected, i.e., no other hypergraph than
the empty hypergraph is stable if c ~(n)>n,1.
Proof. See the appendix.
The reason for the possibility of underconnectivity is crystal clear. The usual intuition
applies; players do not take into account the positive externality that they could generate by
forming an association. The possibility of overconnectivity in network formation by Jackson
and Wolinsky was due to the possible coordination failure.
8 Since coordination by more than
two people is allowed in a hypergraph, it is diﬃcult that a hypergraph is overconnected due to
coordination failure. In fact, all eﬃcient hierarchies are symmetric among players. So,
coordination among them cannot be a problem.
V. Strong Stability
Our concept of stability in a hypergraph has common with the concept of strong stability
in a network proposed by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) and Jackson and Nouweland (2005), in
the sense that both possibly allow joint deviations by more than two players. In this section, we
will brieﬂy discuss how they are related and how they diﬀer.
Jackson and Nouweland (2005) deﬁne a network to be strongly stable, rougly speaking, if
for any coalition S N,( i )a n yp l a y e ri nS has no incentive to break his link and (ii) any
number of pairs in S has no incentive to form new links.
9 If we rephrase our deﬁnition in
terms of the network, a hypergraph is stable if no coalition S has an incentive to form a
complete network among them. Moreover, they allow more than one player to sever their links
or a player to sever his link and simultaneously form a new link with another. None of them is
allowed in our deﬁnition. Since fewer deviations are allowed in our deﬁnition, a strongly stable
network implies a stable hypergraph but not vice versa. For example, consider a star H when
n/4 and let player 1 be the center. If we assume that c/c0 for simplicity, the stability of the
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8 When the star network is eﬃcient, coordination failure may occur if no one wants to be the center who will get the
lowest payoﬀ.
9 The deﬁnition of strong stability by Dutta and Mutuswami is almost the same, except an inequality in the
deﬁnition.hypergraph requires that (i) c+c/4>2(1,d) and (ii) c+c/2?1. Now, to check the strong
stability, suppose that player 4 exits from his current association with player 1 and makes a













3 >0, if c?
3
2(1,d).







is not a strongly stable network, although it is a stable hypergraph.
By incorporating the spirit of the strongly stable network, we can formally deﬁne the
strongly stable hypergraph. The following concepts will be used in deﬁning it.
We say that HS is a transformation of H by a coalition S( N) if (i) a coalition S exit from
some A H, (ii) S form a new association A H, or (iii) any pair of processes (i) and (ii)
simultaneously occur. A transformation can involve a variety of forms. For example, a group of
players in A H exit and then, each of them may remain as a singleton or some/all players
form a new association by (ii). Some coalition S1 A1( H) and another coalition S2 A2( H)
may simultaneously exit and form a new association. Especially, two associations may merge
into one association. We also say that H is subverted by a coalition S if for all i S, pi (HS)
Bpi (H) with inequality for at least one i S. Then, H is a strongly stable hypergraph if there
exists no coalition S subverting H.
If we replace the concept of stability by the strongly stable hypergraph, all of Lemma 1, 2
a n d3s t a t e di nt e r m so fe ﬃciency hold for strong stability, whereas some of them did not hold
for stability. We summarize the result by the following lemma.
Lemma 6 (i)A hierarchical hypergraph cannot be strongly stable for any C(A) and d. (ii) If
S (4 ) N is contained in more than one association in H, H cannot be strongly stable for
any C(A) and d. (iii) The strongly stable hypergraph cannot contain more than one nontrivial
component for any C(A) and d.
Proof. The proofs are immediate by considering transformations deﬁned in the proof of Lemma
1, 2 and 3.
This lemma characterizes strongly stable hypergraphs.
Proposition 5 The unique strongly stable hypergraph is H
n if c ~(n)?n,1 and is H
0 if c ~(n)
>n,1.
Proof. See the appendix.
This proposition implies that the tension between eﬃciency and stability disappears if we
use the concept of strong stability.
In the setting of network formation, Jackson and Nouweland (2005) obtains a similar, quite
general result that if the allocation rule is component-wise egalitarian, the set of strongly stable
networks and the set of eﬃcient networks coincide as long as strongly stable networks exist.
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be split equally among all the coalition members. Since the payoﬀ assumed in this paper clearly
does not correspond to the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule,
10 our result is not a
special case of theirs.
VI. Convex Variable Cost
Suppose that the variable cost of forming an association is convex in its size rather than
linear. In particular, we assume that C(A)/c0+c| A |




where m/| A |.
With the convex cost structure, Lemma 2 does not hold any more while Lemma 1 is still
valid. The intuitive reason is that if the variable cost increases too rapidly with the size of an
association, it may be more eﬃcient to separate the members into several associations even
though some of the members may overlap in more than one association. This suggests that the
eﬃcient hypergraph is not necessarily of an extreme form, either empty or grand. As an
example, take the case that k/2a n dn/3. A star H





*)/2(1,d)+c0,c?0, i.e., if c>2(1,d)+c0.A l s o ,H
* is
more eﬃcient than H
0 which dominates the hypergraph with only one association of size two,
if c?
2+d,c0
4 . Therefore, when c0/
1
2 and dq1, H





Proposition 3 is also not robust to a variation to the convex cost function. For example, let
| R |/rB2 and | A |/m in a star H
*. Then, player i A'R has no incentive to form a grand
association if c ~(n)>(1,d)(n,m). Now, since we know that one of the centers is more likely
to deviate than any peripheral player, we will consider the incentive of player j R to exit from













If c?1,d,w eh a v e
dbpi (H
*)
dm ?0a n ds obpi (H
*) attains its maximum at m/3.
11 Take
r/2. Then, player j would not exit if c ~(3)?1,d.I fk/3a n dn/4, there is d (0,1) such
that c ~(3)?1,d?
c ~(n)
n,3 because c ~(3)?
c ~(n)
n,3. In this case, H
*/{{1,2,3},{1,2,4}} is stable. The
main intuition is that if the cost function is convex, a centerʼs exit from a small association of a
star may not lead to a reduction of the per capital cost while it reduces the beneﬁt, i.e., he will
not exit, thus implying that a star can be stable. Note that the exit of a center from an
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10 The payoﬀ to each player after forming a hypergraph is not equal in our model.
11 Also, note that bpi (H
*) increases with r, in other words, that the larger r is, the smaller the decrease in the beneﬁt
from the exit, and thus the more likely player j is to deviate.association always reduce its per capital cost if the cost function is linear.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we deﬁned the eﬃciency and the stability of the hypergraph and
characterized eﬃcient hypergraphs and stable hypergraphs for the linear cost function.
The hypergraph is a general concept encompassing the concept of network, and can be
applied to economics in a more ﬂexible manner. For example, the formation of free trade
agreements (FTA) is the outcome of multilateral negotiations among possibly more than two
countries. Although many authors model this process as network formation allowing only
bilateral decisions,
12 we believe that it will be more relevant to view FTAs as associations and
the process of forming them as the formation of a hypergraph allowing multilateral decisions.
We look forward to a richer variety of economic applications in the near future.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1:
Suppose that there are A, A' H such that A' A.De ﬁne H'/H,A'. Then, for any i A',
Ci (H')?Ci (H) but Bi (H')/Bi(H), thus pi (H')>pi (H). Also, it is clear that pi (H')/pi (H)
for any i A'. Therefore, V(H')>V(H). This implies that H cannot be eﬃcient.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Let A, A' H (A4A') be two associations such that S A, A'. Deﬁne H'b yH'/H,
(A+A')+(A A'). Then, C(A A')?C(A)+C(A') since | A A'| ?| A |+| A' |. Therefore, V(H')
>V(H).
Proof of Lemma 3:
Suppose that A1, A2 H with A1 A2/ ,|A1 |/n1 and | A2 |/n2 for n1, n2B2. Take any
node i A2 and deﬁne H'/H,(A1+A2)+A1 A2. Then, it is clear that 6i A1 A2 Bi (H')>
6i A1 A2 Bi (H)a n dt h a t6i A1 A2 Ci (H')?6i A1 A2 Ci (H). Therefore, V(H')>V(H).
Proof of Proposition 1:
By Lemma 3, there must be at most one nontrivial component in the eﬃcient hypergraph.
Also, it must consist of one association by Lemma 2. Let H
m be the hypergraph with a
nontrivial component association of size mB2 and let H
1≡H
0. Then, the eﬃcient hypergraph
must be H
m for some mB1. Let the possible nontrivial component be A H
m. Now, consider
H'/H
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Note that bB (H
m)/2m is increasing in m. By comparing equation (1) and (2), we can see that
V(H
2)>V(H
1)i fa n do n l yi fc0+2c?2, and that V(H
m)i si n c r e a s i n gi nm for all mB2i fa n d




decreasing in m for all mB2. Hence, the eﬃcient hypergraph is either H
1 or H
2.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
H
2 would be eﬃcient if and only if c0+2c?2, but it is not possible as far as c>4. Hence, the
only possible eﬃcient hypergraph in this case is H
1. Comparing the values V(H
1)a n dV(H
n)
directly shows that V(H
1)CV(H
n)i fa n do n l yi f c ~(n)Bn,1.
Proof of Lemma 4:
For any A, B H such that A B,w eh a v epi (H,i (A))>pi (H) for any i A,s i n c e
Ci (H,i (A))?Ci (H)a n dBi (H,i(A))/Bi (H).
Proof of Lemma 5:
For any association A H with | A |/m and for any i A,w eh a v e
bCi (H)6Ci (H+A),Ci (H)/c+
c0
m.
Since bCi (H) is decreasing in m, it is smallest when m/n. Also, it is clear that maxA
Bi (H+A)/Bi (H+N). Thus, condition (II) is satisﬁed if any player i N has no incentive to




for all i N.
Proof of Proposition 2:
(i) By Lemma 4, we only need to check whether the grand hypergraph is stable. Deﬁne
H'/H
n ,i (N) for any i N. Then, Bi (H
n) ,Bi (H') /n,1a n dCi (H
n) ,Ci (H') /c ~ (n).
Therefore, player i N will not exit if and only if c ~(n)?n,1. It is clear that H
n satisﬁes the
second condition of stability.





if | R |=2
if | R |B2,









| Ak |(| Ak |,1) has the maximal value of
c+
c0
2 ,1w h e n|Ak |/2. In this case, player i R has no incentive to exit from Ak if
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c0
2 ?1. (3)
If | R |B2, bpi (H
*)/c+
c0
| Ak | ,(1,d)(|Ak |,| R |) has the maximal value of c+
c0
3 ,




and otherwise, he exits.
Next, consider the incentive of player j R to exit. If he exits from some Ak, bBj (H
*)
>bBi (H
*)a n dbCj (H
*)/bCi (H
*). Therefore, if a player in R does not exit, neither does he.
Now, consider the incentive to form a new association. By Lemma 5, we only need to ﬁnd
player i0/arg mini Bi (H
*). Clearly, i0 Ak for some Ak with | Ak |/2a n di0 R, and thus,
Bi0(H










n >(1,d)(n,2) , (5)
no player will join in any new association by Lemma 5. Note that inequality (4) and (5) are not
compatible with each other. Therefore, H* is stable if c ~(2)?1a n dc ~(n)>(1,d)(n,2), and in
t h i sc a s ei tm u s tb et h a t|R |/1.
(iii) Consider the exit incentive. Suppose a player i Lk exits from his association(s), Ak or
Ak+1. The loss in his beneﬁts has the minimal value of 1 when player i L1 exits from A1 with
| A1 |/2. In this case, his cost saving is maximal, i.e., bCi (H
l)/c+
c0
2 .T h u s ,n op l a y e rw i l l
have an incentive to exit if c+c0/2?1 (inequality (3)). If | Lk |B2, the minimal loss is 1,d




3 . Thus, no player will have an incentive to exit if c+c0/3?1,d
(inequality (4)). Also, we know that player j Lk does not exit from his association for any k if
player i Lk does not exit for any k.
Finally, consider the incentive to form the grand association. By Lemma 5, we only need
to ﬁnd player i with minimal Bi (H
l). It is easy to see that player i A1 has the minimal Bi (H
l)






Again, inequality (4) and (6) are not compatible. Therefore, any H
l with | L1 |/| Lm |/1i s




(iv) Consider the incentive to exit from some Ak. Clearly, bCi (H
c)/c+
c0
| Ak |.I ti sa l s o
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either association where H
c/{A1, A2, A3} and | A1 |/| A2 |/| A3 |/2. In this case, bCi (H
c)i s
maximal, i.e., c ~(2). Thus, no player will exit if
c ~(2)?1,d. (7)













t) if n is odd,
(8)
provided that nB4. Note that inequality (7) and inequality (8) are not compatible, implying that
a circle hypergraph cannot be stable. If n/3, it is clear that no player will join in the grand
association. Therefore, in this case, a circle is stable if (7) is satisﬁed.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Consider a star H
*/{Ak | k/1,…,m} for mB2. Suppose H
* is stable. Then, by condition
(i) of stability, it must be that no peripheral player i Ak has an incentive to exit from Ak for
any k. This requires that
c+
c0
| Ak |?(| Ak |,| R |)(1,d). (9)
Also, by condition (ii) of stability, there must be no new association to be formed. Note that
any center has no incentive to join in a new association, because his gain from it is zero. This
means that a proﬁtable new association must consist only of peripheries. Consider a new




n,| R |. (10)
We have | Ak |,| R |?| Ak |+(m,2) for all k. Also, we have | Ak |?n,| R | for some k. This is





n,| R | and |Ak|,| R |?|Ak|+m,2,
inequalities (9) and (10) are contradictory, which implies that H
* cannot be stable.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Suppose H4H
0 is stable. If a player i exits from some A H, the cost reduction is
bCi (H)Bc ~(n) and a decrease in the beneﬁti sbBi (H) cannot exceed n,1 which is maximal.
Therefore, we have bCi (H)Bc ~(n)>n,1BbBi (H). This means that player i always has an
incentive to exit from his association. Hence, H4H
0 cannot be stable.
Proof of Proposition 5:
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m for some mB1. Consider H
m
and let Am be the unique nontrivial component of H
m.T a k eS/Am { j} for any j Am. Then,
H
m+1 is a transformation of H






On the other hand, player j is beneﬁt e db yt h em e r g e ri fm>c ~(m+1). Thus, H
m is subverted
by S if m>c ~(m+1). Note that c ~(m+1) decreases in m. So, if there is m/m
* such that m
*B
c ~(m+1), mBc ~(m+1) for all mBm
*. If there is no such m
*, H
1 is the unique candidate for the
strongly stable hypergraph. Suppose there is such m
*. Then, H
m cannot be strongly stable for
all m such that m
* CmCn,1. Next, consider H
m where m?m
* .I fa n yi Am exits and
remains as a singleton, the change in his payoﬀ is bpi/c ~(m),(m,1)>0, since m?c ~(m) for
all m?m
*. Thus, for any m(41)?m
*, H
m cannot be strongly stable. Therefore, the only
possible candidate for the strongly stable hypergraph is either H
n or H
1. Now, consider H
n.N o
single player will exit if c ~(n)?n,1. Also, a deviation by S with | S |/m41 is most proﬁtable
when they form a new association after exiting. Clearly, they have no incentive to deviate since







m is strongly stable if c ~(n)?n,1. Finally, consider H
1.I fp l a y e ri N forms an
association with S with | S |/m where 1CmCn,1, the change in the payoﬀ is
bpi/m,c ~(m+1). Hence, H
1 is strongly stable if bpi?0 for all m, i.e., c ~(n)>n,1.
REFERENCES
Aumann, R. and Drèze, J. (1974), “Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures,” International
Journal of Game Theory 3, pp.217-237.
Bala, V.and Goyal, S. (2000), “A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation,” Econometrica
68, pp.1181-1229.
Dutta, B. and Mutuswami, S. (1997), “Stable Networks,” Journal of Economic Theory 76,
pp.322-344.
Furusawa, T. and Konishi, H. (2007), “Free Trade Networks,” Journal of International
Economics 72, pp.310-335.
Goyal, S. and Joshi, S. (2006), “Bilateralism and Free Trade,” International Economic Review
47, pp.749-778.
Hart, S. and Kurz, M. (1983), “Endogenous Formation of Coalitions,” Econometrica 51,
pp.1047-1064.
Jackson, M. and van den Nouweland A. (2005), “Strongly Stable Networks,” Games and
Economic Behavior 51, pp.420-444.
Jackson, M. and Wolinsky, A. (1996), “A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks,”
Journal of Economic Theory 71, pp.44-74.
Myerson, R. (1977), “Graphs and Cooperation in Games,” Mathematics of Operations Research
HYPERGRAPH FORMATION GAME 2009] 1212, pp.225-229.
Myerson, R. (1980), “Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules,” International Journal
of Game Theory 9, pp.169-182.
Slikker, M., Dutta, B., van den Nouweland, A., and Tijs, S. (2000), “Potential Maximizers and
Network Formation,” Mathematical Social Sciences 39, pp.55-70.
HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [December 122